

constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. *See Jackson v. Arizona*, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989).

Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the court applies the same standard under Section 1915(e)(2) when reviewing the adequacy of a complaint or amended complaint. Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. *See Chappel v. Laboratory Corp. of America*, 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A complaint must contain more than a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;" it must contain factual allegations sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). "The pleading must contain something more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action." *Id.* In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, *Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees*, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to plaintiff and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. *Jenkins v. McKeithen*, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

Allegations in a *pro se* complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. *See Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (*per curiam*); *see also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). All or part of a complaint filed by a prisoner may be dismissed *sua sponte*, however, if the prisoner's claims lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact. This includes claims based on legal conclusions that are untenable (*e.g.* claims against defendants who are immune from suit or claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist), as well as claims based on fanciful factual allegations (*e.g.* fantastic or delusional scenarios). *See Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 327-28; *see also McKeever v. Block*, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

To sustain an action under section 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." *Hydrick v. Hunter*, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006).

## **II. Instant Complaint**

Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at Northern Nevada Correctional Center ("NNCC") has sued the State of Nevada, Nevada Department of Corrections ("NDOC") Medical Director Robert Bannister, NNCC Warden James Benedetti, and NNCC Director of Nursing John Peery, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights as well as violations of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.

As an initial matter, while plaintiff names the State of Nevada as a defendant, states are not persons for purposes of § 1983. *See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona*, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997); *Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); *Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat'l Lab.*, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); *Hale v. Arizona*, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc); *Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc.*, 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991). Section 1983 claims against states, therefore, are legally frivolous. *See Jackson v. Arizona*, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (*en banc*). Accordingly, all claims against the State of Nevada are dismissed with prejudice. The State of Nevada is dismissed from this action.

Further, the court notes that, "Where a particular amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of "substantive due process," must be the guide for analyzing [a plaintiff's] claims'." *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., for plurality) (quoting *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Therefore, plaintiff's claims will be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment rather any generalized notions of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and his Fourteenth Amendment

due process claim, set forth in Count III, must be dismissed.

## A. Count I: Eighth Amendment Claims

With respect to the remaining defendants, Bannister, Benedetti and Peery, plaintiff alleges that while at Lovelock Correctional Center ("LCC") he was allowed to purchase contact lenses and lense solution, but that since his transfer to NNCC in 2009, defendants have refused to allow plaintiff to purchase contact lenses. Plaintiff claims that defendants "did not ensure that the plaintiff had a legitimate alternative, *i.e.*, a pair of glasses that allowed him to see clearly and did not cause headaches, dizziness, and nausea." Plaintiff contends that defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments and "embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency." *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). A detainee or prisoner's claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." *Id.* at 106. The "deliberate indifference" standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, "sufficiently serious." *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing *Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind," which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." *Id.* 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, "the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere 'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action." *Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories*, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 105-06. "[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does

not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner." *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. at 106; *see also Anderson v. County of Kern*, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); *McGuckin v. Smith*, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992) (*overruled on other grounds*), *WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller*, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. *See Wood v. Housewright*, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). A prisoner's mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference. *Sanchez v. Vild*, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).

Delay of, or interference with, medical treatment can also amount to deliberate indifference. *See Jett v. Penner*, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006); *Clement v. Gomez*, 298 F.3d 898, 905 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002); *Hallett v. Morgan*, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2002); *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996); *Jackson v. McIntosh*, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996); *McGuckin v. Smith*, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992) *overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller*, 104 F.3d 1133, (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997) (en banc); *Hutchinson v. United States*, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1988). Where the prisoner is alleging that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, however, the prisoner must show that the delay led to further injury. *See Hallett*, 296 F.3d at 745-46; *McGuckin*, 974 F.2d at 1060; *Shapley v. Nev. Bd. Of State Prison Comm'rs*, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985) (per curiam). Plaintiff alleges that defendant medical personnel have refused to allow him to purchase contact lenses or to provide eyeglasses that do not cause blurry vision, headaches, dizziness and nausea. Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment claim.

## B. Count II: Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants "have failed to treat the plaintiff equally to other similarly situated inmates" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff appears to base this claim on his allegation that while incarcerated at LCC, he and other prisoners were allowed to purchase contact lenses, but defendants have not allowed him to do the same at NNCC.

"Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race." *Wolff v. McDonnell*, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Prisoners

are also protected by the Equal Protection Clause from intentional discrimination on the basis of their religion. *See Freeman v. Arpaio*, 125 F.3d 732, 737 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997). To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the prisoner must present evidence of discriminatory intent. *See Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976). Plaintiff has not alleged that defendants intentionally discriminated against him based on race or religion or his membership in any other protected class. Therefore, plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim is dismissed.

## III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall detach and FILE the complaint (Docket #1, Exhibit B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against the State of Nevada are dismissed with prejudice. The State of Nevada is **DISMISSED** from this action.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Bannister, Benedetti and Peery in Count I may proceed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count II is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Count III is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall electronically serve a copy of this order, including the attached Intent to Proceed with Mediation Form, along with a copy of plaintiff's complaint, on the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Nevada, attention Pamela Sharp. The Attorney General shall advise the Court within twenty-one (21) days of the date of entry of this order whether they can accept service of process for the named defendants and the last known address under seal of the defendants for which they cannot accept service. If the Attorney General accepts service of process for any named defendant(s), such defendant(s) shall file and serve an answer or other response to the complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of the notice of acceptance of service.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties SHALL DETACH, COMPLETE, AND

**FILE** the attached Intent to Proceed with Mediation Form on or before **thirty (30) days** from the date of entry of this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that henceforth, plaintiff shall serve upon defendants, or, if an appearance has been made by counsel, upon their attorney(s), a copy of every pleading, motion, or other document submitted for consideration by the court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper submitted for filing a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of the document was mailed to the defendants or counsel for defendants. If counsel has entered a notice of appearance, the plaintiff shall direct service to the individual attorney named in the notice of appearance, at the address stated therein. The court may disregard any paper received by a district judge or a magistrate judge that has not been filed with the Clerk, and any paper which fails to include a certificate showing proper service.

DATED this 12th day of July, 2010.

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE** 

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	Plaintiff,	Case No.
v.		NOTICE OF INTENT TO PROCEED WITH MEDIATION
	Defendants.	) 
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4.	List any and all cases, includi	ing the case number, that are currently pending or any pendi	
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5.	Are there any other comments you would like to express to the court about whether this cas suitable for mediation. You may include a brief statement as to why you believe this cas suitable for mediation. (Attach additional pages if needed).		
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